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STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE. By Martin Shubik. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1959. Pp. 327. $8.00.
THE urge to reform, the aspiration to guide the hand of the lawmaker and
the adjudicator, is a dominant theme in the economic literature of the West.1
The desire to be objective, disinterested, or wcrt-jrei is a newer aspiration,
indeed a categorical canon of modern economic "science." Mr. Shubik ex-
hibits both of these aspirations 2 in his new publication. He seeks to help
steer the course of our antitrust policy by injecting greater clarity and sys-
tematization into such concepts as collusion, control, and cooperation in mar-
kets, without presumptuous dicta about just what constitutes "fair or work-
able" competition or just what sort of "fitness" ought to survive.3 An evalua-
tion of Shubik's effort seems naturally to lead to an assessment of the utility
of theoretical economic advice to judges and legislators in general.
That Shubik has widened the scope of traditional economics is not to be
questioned. To a rudimentary doctrine of monopolistic competition he has
assimilated a number of significant variables: entry conditions, asset structure,
information costs, contingent demand, inventory policy. His analysis, which he
calls "institutional dynamics," is therefore far more hospitable to empirical
data than has generally been the case. This enables him to transcend many
of the convenient fictions employed as behavior axioms in the familiar ex-
plorations of technical possibilities that have passed as a theory of the firm.
His thesis, which is consistent with Adelman's,4 is that we need to decide
what kinds and degrees of market control we will permit. To this end he
builds a bridge from traditional economics to the law by means of the theory
of games. Thus he escapes the confines of the false dichotomy between com-
petition and collusion which has colored much economic and legal thought,
and replaces that dichotomy with a continuum of market structures differen-
tiated according to "strategic interlinkages," "stability structures," and "strat-
egy spaces."
In this new frame of reference the traditional view of fair competition both
in law and economics turns out to be a very special type of "game" involving
a pure opposition of interests. In such a game there is no point in the op-
ponents' communicating or cooperating with one another. Many champions of
consumer sovereignty dream fondly of such pure opposition among competi-
tive producers, just as some champions of justice are fond of the system of
competitive exaggeration by rival attorneys. The idea seems to be, "Every
1. See Samuelson, What Econotndsts Kiow, in THE Hu11AN Jfm&PAnI oF THE
SociAL Scmwcns 195 (Lerner ed. 1959).
2. See pp. 329, 336.
3. P. 335.
4. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Hav. L R-v. 1287
(1948).
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part a mass of vice, and yet the whole is paradise."5 Classical economics, with
its predilections for equilibria and harmony of interests,0 set itself the task of
devising just such a set of axioms and congenial assumptions as would provide
a model of this type of game for a free market "system." So attractive and
beguiling was the outcome of this game that its purchase price in terms of
abstraction was cheerfully forgotten, or else the validity of the assumptions
was derived from the strength of the conclusions they permitted. Great drafts
of vulgarized economic theory were gulped down 'by Court and Congress, and
not a few economists were self-intoxicated, "taking for truth the maddest of
miracles,' 7 relying as it were on rnachinae e.. deo.
Economists, after a decade of struggle with their "new welfare economics,"
have lately purged themselves of once inarticulate value premises embedded
in what had been considered positive generalizations. 8 The purely ancillary
character of such terms as "economizing" and "efficiency" is now more wide-
ly recognized. Shubik scrupulously shows his cleanliness in this regard, points
to old errors and sounds the new warnings. He stakes 'his claim to objectivity
on a ruthless separation of "physically measurable factors of a problem from
the behavioristic factors."9 He carefully buries the behavioral uncertainties
which plague the market phenomena he is studying; like many other econo-
mists, he appears to have had enough of giving the benefit of the doubt to
improbable cases, enough of the trivial business of concocting logically suffi-
cient human "reaction functions" which purchase determinateness for a game
by calling on the players to show "repeated misconceptions" or "compulsive
idiocy."' 0 Such tactics only add up to irrelevance 11 or nonsense.12 With com-
mendable caution and appropriate intellectual honesty and modesty he sets out
to narrow the long-acknowledged "ranges of indeterminacy" in market theory
"without being forced to make assumptions about behavior which could 'be
verified only by psychologists.' 3 Though he writes of motives, strategies,
threats, and so forth, he professes a wish to avoid "realistic complications,"
"psychological factors,"' 14 "socio-political sentiment,"' 5 and "complex be-
havioristic assumptions."'16
This passion for behavioral antisepsis leads him to incessant mathematical
ablutions. Fingers are counted and shoes are put off lest we lose a variable
or allow one to sneak in under its own power. A whole font of type, ordinarily
reserved for comic strip expletives, is used to translate blackmail threats or
5. MANDEVILLE, THE GRUMBLING HivE lines 155-56 (1772).
6. See MYRDAL, RicH LANDS AND POOR ch. 2 (1957).
7. Quoted in MORGENSTERN, TnE LIMITs OF EoONoMics 113 (1937).
8. See GRAAFF, THzoRErIcAL WELFARE EcoNomics (1957).
9. P. 148.









maximization rules 17 into mathematical form, but it has served mainly, it
seems, to hypnotize the proofreaders.28 A major reason given for avoiding
"realistic complications" is that "the mathematical difficulties are consider-
able."' 91 The notion that this demonstrates the unsuitability or limitations of
mathematics in behavior studies would of course be an unpardonable affront
to current epistemological fashions in economics.
When real human behavior is discussed, cold rationality gets the benefit of
the doubt. Thus Shubik leans, albeit hesitantly, toward the notion that rivals
in a bilateral-monopoly "game" will first maximize joint payoff and then
settle up ;20 that a calculation of expected costs and revenues will reveal the
"plausibility" of a threat ;21 that elements of uncertainty can be assigned prob-
abilities ;22 that mathematical probabilities can be calculated in games of short
duration33
Thus a nice question is posed: If heroically contrived behavioral assump-
tions are to be renounced, and if objectivity precludes treatment of such
phenomena as motive, purpose, and will, where can one turn? Several possi-
bilities arise:
1. Indefinite postponement of all attempts to forecast, advise or promul-
gate policy.
2. A desire to command behavior consistent with the assumptions known
to be associated with desirable outcomes.
3. A resort to fictions, by terms of which certain acts, ex past, are
"deemed" to have arisen from certain conditions.
4. Empirical compilation of a population of events sufficiently homogene-
ous to permit a statistical inference of probable causation.
5. An exhaustive notation for arranging all conceivable patterns of be-
havior, permitting categorization of acts for policy purposes.
The last response is Shubik's. "At least theoretically," he asserts game
theory permits a complete catalog of all alternative actions available to all
participants.2 Mapping out "the extensive form of a game," by means of a
construct known as a "game tree,"25 is akin to composing a completely ex-
plicit handbook, such as would enable an agent (perhaps a mechanical one)
to play for a completely relaxed principal. A single path down through the
"branches" of this "tree" might be prescribed by rules or assumptions, or
classes of alternatives could be stipulated as unfair or unreasonable as a mat-
ter of social policy.2 The economist serves society well who delineates the
structure of the tree fully and disinterestedly.
17. P. 220.
18. Pp. 99, 126, 173, 202, 267, 336.
19. P. 276.
20. P. 49.
21. Pp. 231, 283.
22. P. 216.
23. P. 205.
24. Pp. 149, 330.
25. Pp. 186-90.
26. Pp. 201 227, 242,250, 271.
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A market "game tree" shows at once the possibility of market games or
structures which, while not games of pure opposition, are not necessarily col-
lusive or cooperative,2 7 a point noted -by Smithies in his commentary on the
Cement and Conduit cases. 28 The proposition is that structure as well as con-
spiracy can restrain commerce, as appears to have been acknowledged in the
Armaour dismissal.29 Perhaps because "structure" is free of sentiment, psy-
chological complexity, and the like, Shubik tends to agree with the Alcoa
rule 30 that degree of control of the market is the central issue, rather than
with the U.S. Steel rule,31 that the manner of getting and wielding power is
crucial. He would rather refine economic tests of market control than "fall
back on" the fiction of "implicit collusion" or "conscious parallelism."
To this end he offers five different "indices for the measurement of strategic
interlinkage between firms." These are long-run and short-run market vulner-
ability, long-run and short-run financial vulnerability, and control vulnerabil-
ity.32 These "rule of thumb" measures of interdependence are derived from
the theoretical construct of a "game of economic survival," and are intended
to illuminate the range of possible behaviors on the competition-collusion con-
tinuum. They purport to measure the reciprocal damage that can be done by
firms through strategic shifts of policy, the resistance that firms' assets can
offer to bankruptcy, and the ability of firms to forestall capture.
These indices purport to, but do not, measure; they are concepts. To be
operational they would have to specify what is meant by "an incremental
change in strategy" by a rival firm, and they would have to isolate the sub-
stantial elements of unpredictability in the success of various strategies.
Though he has told us something new about market structures, Shubik has
for the most part told us what we would have to know about structure if we
were to use it ex ante in policy prescriptions. With respect to market behavior
he offers no advice, since 'behavioral rules would, after all, be no stronger than
their weakest subjective or psyohological links. But with respect to market
structure he feels bolder, forging chains of reasoning which are, after all, no
weaker than their weakest well-formed mathematical links. Yet any court or
administrative agency relying on his structural criteria would have to be pretty
good at entrail reading.
But if reliable criteria were at hand, it would be possible to estimate which
of several varieties of "stability" are consistent with the state of a market.
By "stability" of a market structure, Shubik means a set of conditions under
which it does not pay to take any action to upset the status quo. Stability is
absolutely competitive if there are no collusive gains to be had even by those
who wish to collude; stability is completely collusive if the status quo can be
27. P. 330.
28. Smithies, Ecowmic Consequences of the Basing Point Decisions, 63 HARV. L.
Ray. 308 (1949).
29. United States v. Armour & Co., Civil No. 48-C-1351, N.D. IlL., Sept. 15, 1948.
30. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).




upheld only -by having every "player" retaliate against a single deviant.m Be-
tween these limiting cases lies a range in which varying degrees of collusive
policing or cautious inhibition may support various equilibria.
The vagueness and elusiveness of Shubik's conceptual criteria provide a
sandy foundation for policy formulations. Although the criteria are admittedly
more sophisticated than the simplistic stab in the same direction made by
Judge Learned Hand when he applied his percentage-control-of-the-market
test in Alcoa, no reliable test emerges from the book. The lacunae in his
catalog of market structures are as frustrating as his renunciation of the
cataloging of market behaviors.
II
This now raises the more general question, can positivistic, normative social
scientists offer useful expert testimony to legislators and judges? Can eco-
.nomics help the law?
I have already alluded -to the dangers inherent in the older, more crudely
ideological economics. Eighteenth and nineteenth century judges boldly fash-
ioned this into law-witness, for example, the economic rationale of such a
sequence of decisions as Pullis, Carlisle, Adair, Loewe, Locliner, Adkins, with
its sorry impact on generations of American wage-earners.3
One way to avoid rendering faulty or irrelevant economic generalizations
into law is the unintentionally ironic method employed by Holmes (dissent-
ing) in Plant v. Woods.35 Indicating his own calm confidence in the now
thoroughy discredited wages-fund doctrine of J. S. Mill, he urged that, even
though they were deceiving themselves, workers should be allowed to build
up their collective strength for the struggle for higher wages. Smug but
generous deference to the majority of reasonable but uninformed men can
thus save society from the well-intended mistakes of the educated. The best
insurance against premature acceptance of economics by the law might well
be some kind of majoritarian referendum.
Another way in which society might protect itself is by employing the
nakedly honest arbitrary fiction 3 -- much to be preferred to the seemingly
scientific, objectively induced, undeclared fiction which is ushered in with such
phrases as "in the light of economic fact." When, as with captured Romans,
the alive are "deemed" dead, or when parallel market action is "deemed" col-
lusive, less harm may be done than when inferences from hypothetical struc-
tural tests are submitted as "facts of common knowledge." Where ignorance
must rule, let it be brazenly emblazoned; the door to learning is thus left
irritatingly ajar.
Does the economist protest that society no longer needs to protect itself
from economic findings, now that economists have grown up? Now that
33. Pp. 276-78.
34. See Cobb-mAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MiNORmY RIHTS (1945); GREoRY, Loa
AND THE LAw (2d ed. 1958) ; JAcKsoN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1951).
35. 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900) (dissenting opinion).
36. See Fuller, Legal Fictionm, 25 ILL. L R-v. 363, 513, 870 (1930).
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economists have said so many meac culpas and have sworn to purge them-
selves-like Shubik--of the value judgments that threaten to deprive them
of the accolade of scientists, is it not safe to consult them? If economics has
outgrown (or is at least now shedding) apologetics, tautologies and ideologies,
if it is ready to talk structure and function, if it is self-conscious about want-
ing to turn out tools that can 'be used by anyone, not just by mechanistic,
optimistic, rationalistic, nineteenth-century Americans, why not listen?
Yet persuasive reasons remain for urging continued resistance to the ren-
dering of economic intelligence into law. There is a total qualitative leap from
economic prescription to law. The problem of "fit" remains to be worked out.
The shared predilection, which once provided a kind of apparent fit, especially
when ideological constructs were regarded as "systems" having objective
validity, is now disavowed by economics and by those jurists who wish to
minimize judge-made law. If analytically indeterminate problems are to be
arbitrarily resolved, let such Gordian knots be sliced by those holding public
trust in a context of constitutional safeguards. What causes the lack of fit
between economics and law ? For the law, the business of economizing is an
activity; for economics it is a body of doctrine, a set of norms. Economics is
conceptual, but economic policy is performatory. Since conceptual language
abstracts from the complexity of performatory detail, it can never be directly
prescriptive. Prescriptive language contains a value aspect which is situational.
Thus the value content of a prescription is not merely ambiguous, it is polyg-
uous, having as many connotations as there are situations. Believing a con-
ceptual doctrine calls for reasons, but the reasons for believing something are
not necessarily the reasons for doing something--witness the economic doc-
trine of free trade based on the principle of comparative advantage. Economics
is wholesale; the law is retail, to paraphrase Hall. 8 Economics is grammar;
the law is speech. As Einstein once observed, economics is sure of itself only
when it deals with unreality.89 In matters before the House or the Court it
is hesitant, hedging, and halting-if it is honest.
A distinction between "planning" and "administration" advanced by Mann-
heim 40 is useful here. According to Mannheim, an administrative mentality
thinks in terms of systematization, determinateness, generalization-a settled
course of action. A planning mentality, on the other hand, thinks in terms of
experimentation, improvisation, reconstruction-a learning course. Economics,
as a formal, behavioristic set of norms, hungers for determinateness and uni-
versality; it generally despises meandering discursiveness, inconclusiveness
and particular anecdotes. It has therefore retreated deep into abstraction, as
37. My answer borrows the terminology of Hartnan, General Theory of Value, in
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU MILIEU DU VINGTItME SikCLE (Klibansky ed, 1958).
38. Hall, Practical Reason(s) and the Deadlock in Ethics, 64 MIND 319 (1955).
39. Quoted in Kaufman, On the Postulates of Economic Theory, 9 SociAL REsEacH
379 (1942).
40. MANNHEIM,, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE oF RECONSTRUCTION (Shils transl.
1.949) (especially part IV).
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its patron saint mathematics has done, confident that, like mathematics, it vaU
return to earth girded for impressive concrete triumphs.
As it streaks into abstract space, economics shucks off the sources of its
indeterminateness; values, motives, purposes are all consumed in the white
heat of dispassionate objectivity. For the administrative mentality the subjec-
tive -value element in behavior measures the extent of his lack of mastery or
organization and must be shed if a unique solution is to be found for each
economic process. Such explorations of abstract space are of course legitimate,
but a staggering reentry problem must be faced if the doctrines thus dis-
'covered are to be brought down to earth to govern men.
So the barrier remains. Having solved its problems with fictions, economics
cannot offer its findings as facts. Motives, banished in favor of arbitrary
axioms or probabilistic correlations, cannot suddenly reappear, tamed, as
handy imputations. How then can economists "sell" their "semifinished intel-
lectual goods"? 1 A mathematical methodology makes for eye-catching pack-
aging, but if the models of a science are mathematical, and the conclusions
are offered as relevant, the prior premise must be that the world is mathe-
matical.4 This is a value judgment, vitiating any claim to objectivity, the
worship of which is another value judgment. It also frustrates "reentry" in
any society which is not positivistic.
What does this add up to? An indefinite postponement of all attempts by
economists to forecast, to advise, or to promulgate policy prescriptions? Not
that.
Some scope exists for fruitful consultation between economics and the law.
Just how much depends on knowing what economics is good at and what it
is not good at. Economics is at its worst when it tries to offer conclusive in-
struction with respect to conflicts of individual interest; it still knows nothing
very useful about problems of fair division. It is at its best when it advises
on the compensation of impersonal aggregates or issues programmatic state-
ments about interdependent variables. When economics becomes personal and
individual, it pays the price for its behavioristic dehumanization; when it be-
comes impersonal and systemic, it can contribute valuable advice on the design
of social apparatus.
To illustrate: The most significant and complicated issue in labor relations
is the division of jointly created, anticipated revenue into "fair shares" for the
contributing factors of production. Attempts on the part of economists to im-
pute proper income shares to these factors add up to a widely confessed "in-
determinateness," except when improbable assumptions are contrived. For
economics to be useful in social policy formulations, it should recommend an
income distribution formula (e.g., collective bargaining) which in its initial
premise confesses the analytical indeterminateness of the problem.
A second illustration: One of the most vexing economic problems in our
41. See Kaufman, sura note 39, at 379.
42. See Deutsch, On ComnnQimcatlion Models in the Social Sciences, 16 PuaBtc
OpiNioN Q. 364-66 (1952).
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society is the avoidance or mitigation of inflationary and deflationary trends.
Here lie all our hopes for full employment and our fears of the cost of living.
Attempts on the part of economists to control these fluctuations through
policies deduced from classical models of individual investment and consump-
tion decisions were conspicuously unsuccessful. To be useful, economics had to
devise systemic models from which emerged flexible instruments for compen-
sating aggregate streams of expenditures.
Economics is most useful when it avoids direct prescriptive contact with
individuals, applying its structural, systemic insights to individuals only
through impersonal alteration of the weights assigned to individual tastes and
plans. Such an approach is consonant with the doctrine of functional juris-
prudence, which is concerned not with states of mind, but with states of
affairs; not with fault or blame, but with effects. Without pretending to know
the structural or behavioral intricacies of antecedent conditions, we can let
"good" results live on and stamp out %ad" ones. If conceptual economics
cannot be translated directly into performatory terms for use in value-laden
economizing situations, it should ally itself with that style of jurisprudence
which declares bankrupt "any word that cannot pay up in the currency of
fact .... -4
Economists should not help legislators and judges evade moral obligations
by delegating decisions to abstract concepts and hidden forces. Instead they
should program the probable ramifications of adjustments of policy instru-
ments (e.g., taxes, public investment, unfair labor practices, minimum wages),
so as to help the majority decide how to alter an unwanted state of affairs.
To return at last to Shubik's book, his objectives are not altogether unlike
those endorsed here, but his confidence in the ultimate as well as the present
worth of his structural concepts, indices, and criteria seems both excessive
and premature.
DANIEL HALE GRAYj
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW. By Harold J. Berman. Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1958. Pp. xviii, 662. $7.50.
Is there a place in the undergraduate curriculum for a course on the legal
process? If so, what should be its content? These, as I see it, are the central
questions raised by the publication of Professor Berman's pioneering text,
The Nature and Functions of Law.
This reviewer comments as a political scientist engaged in teaching public
law and government courses to undergraduate and graduate students in liberal
arts. But before the shattering cry goes up, "He's not a lawyer l" I might
note -for the record that I received a diploma from a well-known legal trade
school off Massachusetts Avenue in ,Cambridge, visited on the faculty of its
43. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLuIm. L.
REv. 809, 823 (1935).
tAssociate Professor, Economics, Tufts University.
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sister institution fronting Wall Street in New Haven, and have been initiated
into the solemn company of the District of Columbia Bar. Thus, if I mis-
understand the noble purposes of both law and liberal arts, it is not from a
failure of exposure to either.
Courses dealing with law have been a standard item in the undergraduate
curriculum for many decades. Departments of Political Science usually offer
constitutional, administrative, and international law, and some teach juris-
prudence. Departments of History provide studies of the constitutional and
legal histories of particular countries or cultures. Anthropologists teach "Law
in Primitive Societies" and Philosophy Departments rarely omit a course in
some aspect of legal theory. Economics Departments and Schools of Industrial
Relations give labor law, while Business Schools feature assorted offerings on
contract law, law of business associations and the like. These are all courses
dealing with small-"'-law, or the law of something. What Professor Berman
wants taught is capital-"L"-Law, or, as law students quickly learn to intone
reverentially, "the Law"-the total mystery, from seamless web to "solemn
Ass."
A course of this kind, listed variously as "Law and Society," "The Legal
Process," or "The Growth of the Law," has appeared in a number of leading
universities in recent years. At times, as at Harvard and Yale, the course has
been taught by law professors. If I sense at least a part of their primary
motivations, these law professors mix a missionary zeal to spread the message
of the Law as Philosopher-King in the heathen clime of the college with a
bit of personal hunger for the broader intellectual atmospheres of the Arts
School, the opportunity it provides to speculate about problems of -philosophy,
politics, and history without having to sandwich these in, somewhat guiltily,
among the daily bread-and-butter sessions of the Law School. And, to put it
frankly, when it comes to probing the fundamentals of "the Law," law stu-
dents are not as lively and as adventurous a group to teach as the good under-
graduates. In other instances, the course on "the Law" has been given by
political scientists. My colleagues, I observe, often undertake this mission be-
cause they feel it grossly unfair that law faculties should have a monopoly on
the fun of playing Socrates, although it must be noted that the political sciea-
tists rarely know what it is to face the cup of hemlock that a crack law school
class can thrust forward in the midst of a daily dialogue on a fine point of
law.
Professor Berman, a member of the faculty of the Harvard Law School,
has taught courses on the Law at Harvard College and M.I.T., and has con-
ducted an experimental seminar in legal method for younger faculty members
in the social sciences. From this experience, he is convinced that "a basic
understanding of the nature and functions of law is by no means inaccessible
to the non-lawyer, and . . . can be of the greatest interest and value", to
college students. The trouble with existing Law courses, Berman states in his
1. P. iv.
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preface, is that the instructor must choose at present between bad texts or
his own set of readings.
Books written for laymen which attempt to present an overall picture of
the legal system are usually either too technical or not technical enough,
and in any case are not suitable as textbooks for a course. As a result
each instructor has tended to compile his own special selection of read-
ings. While this diversity of approach 'has certain advantages, there is
also a need for a common effort toward creating a common discipline,
through which the benefits of diverse experience may be shared.2
Berman's contribution toward a common curriculum is divided into four
sections. In Part One, "Law as a Process of Resolution of Disputes: Illus-
trations From Civil and Criminal Procedure," and Part Two, "Law as a
Process of Maintaining Historical Continuity and Doctrinal Consistency: Il-
lustrations From the Development of Doctrines of Manufacturer's Liability
in Tort," Berman has assembled a nice set of original essays, case materials
and edited articles. His technique of orienting the student into the subject is
concrete enough to hold their interest while speculative enough to fire their
minds. I particularly like the choice of the manufacturer's tort liability prob-
lem because it shows the concepts of common law growth, change, and search
for continuity. In Part Three, "Law as a Process of Facilitating and Protect-
ing Voluntary Arrangements: Illustrations From Judicial Remedies for Breach
of Contract," and Part Four, "Law as a Process of Resolving Acute Social
Conflict: Illustrations From Labor Law," Berman reproduces substantial
chunks from two distinguished casebooks written .by 'his colleagues Lon Fuller
and Archibald Cox,3 with some questions and notes interspersed by Berman
to fix the attention of the non-law-student on special points.
All of this is mounted, it is a sad duty to report, in the worst of the law
school book format. The Foundation Press, as though to -impart utter authen-
ticity, has employed the lack-lustre hornbook covering, dense typography, for-
malistic 'heading-type system, and sterile page format which has signified to
generations of law students that their adventures with graceful books were
over for three years. And, while there is no accounting for taste in humor as
in other matters, it is strange to find two dreadfully dreary cartoons thrown
into the first fifty pages, as if to show that law isn't really so stuffy, after
which a desert of type ensues for the next 600. At least political scientists
have had the inspiration to employ Herblock as their graphic colleague in
textbook ventures.
To turn to the questions raised by this book, first, is there a valid place in
the undergraduate curriculum for a course on "the Law"? I will not deal with
this issue in terms of academic nihilism, as by saying that there is as much
place as for the courses in basket weaving, driver education, social dancing, or
folk music which have elbowed their way into the curriculum of some of our
most distinguished universities. The question is whether such a course 'belongs
in a university which offers subjects appropriate to the liberal arts concept.
2. Ibid.
3. FuLL.R, BASIC CONTRAcr LAW (1947); Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1958).
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At this level, two possible objections to a course in Law might be projected.
One is that such a course is too career-oriented. Berman's text is clearly not
vulnerable to that protest. The materials do not teach the law on any subject
in the professional sense, nor do they aim to rehabilitate lawyers from their
periodic lows in public esteem, nor to train students in the great American
legal game of Judge-Watching. The basic question Berman raises: What is a
system of law? If it is appropriate to say that a student leaves college incom-
pletely equipped if he lacks an awareness of what is involved in the problems
of science, history, literature, or politics, surely an ignorance of the process of
law is equally damaging. Yet most undergraduates have astoundingly ignorant
concepts about the legal process, and only a few will have this remedied by
law-school work. While I would not suggest that an undergraduate who failed
to take a course in a particular subject was doomed to eternal ignorance on
that matter, self-education in the process of law is harder, and less likely, for
the arts graduate than his obtaining a generalist's grounding in history or
economics or sociology, fields in which books for laymen are more frequently
and better written than in the field of law. In short, I see no validity in a
criticism of a course on Law such as Professor Berman's on the basis that it
represents a careerist intrusion into the liberal arts cloister.
Another possible objection is that the undergraduate is not prepared for
such a course. Sometimes this is urged on the ground of his tender years.
Sometimes, it is suggested in terms of the undergraduate's lack of mastery of
the rudiments of economics, history, government, and the like, which are
described as necessary prerequisites for a consideration of law. Neither argu-
ment is persuasive. Those law professors who teach undergraduates usually
come away pleasantly surprised at their capacity to handle legal materials,
when properly presented, and it is hard to see that a college senior, only one
year away from his entrance to law school (were he to choose that course)
is so incompletely endowed as to bar him from work in legal processes. More
important, the kinds of questions which flow from the Berman materials-the
transfer of social conflicts into courts, the reasoning method in law, the com-
parison of procedural systems in America with those on the Continent-com-
plement intellectual inquiries in main areas of the liberal arts curriculum and
are concerns worth the attention of an undergraduate seeking to understand
what society is and how it functions.
The second major question raised by the Berman book deals with course
content. My main reaction is not to disparage what Berman has placed in his
collection, which I find for the most part attractive, but to question what he
has omitted, which seems too much and too fundamental.
For example, no use is -made of available documentary materials to portray
a legal proceeding from its beginning t6 its end. The only thing in Berman's
book which comes near to this is the report of a demonstration of a pretrial
conference in federal court.4 Surely there was no need to rely on a mock trial
when tons of original records and transcripts beckon for skillful editing and
4. Pp. 134-49.
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presentation to the student. The late Judge Jerome Frank noted eloquently
that presentation of the documentary materials of legal proceedings and con-
flicts was absolutely essential for law students,6 and I think undergraduates
would profit from it as well. The idea of using transcript materials of a case
has already been experimented with in law school texts,0 utilized in moot
court programs at several law schools, and is the basis of a current text pri-
marily intended for liberal arts students, 7 and I think that Berman's is pre-
eminently the type of work which should include such materials.
Another shortcoming of the Berman collection is its overly impersonal pres-
entation of the nature and functions of law. This is not to say that students
receive a wholly mechanistic impression; there are, for example, two short
selections of comments 'by judges as to the external and internal processes of
their profession.8 But the Berman text falls quite short in making the student
aware of the men who shape the law as counselors, advocates, legislators,
judges, executives, and even law professors. One could think of a variety of
techniques to use here, from biographical selections and excerpts from reveal-
ing historical episodes to originally written descriptions by the editor of the
characteristics of the roles played -by the above men in making law. At any
rate, something more is needed, especially since the question of the personal
factor in the judicial process is a topic of great interest to the liberal arts
student in the contemporary climate of legal realism.
Finally, I think that it would have been useful to employ some hypothetical
cases to provide the basis for extended classroom discussion. The cases de-
vised -by Lon Fuller, such as his "Case of the Speluncean Explorers" and
the "Case of the Grudge Informer,"' 0 are so excellent for undergraduate use
-as this reviewer has fourid-that something like this would be a fine teach-
ing tool to include in future editions of the Berman volume.
A final word might be said about the undergraduate course on Law and
champions of it such as Professor Berman. Not the least justification for such
a venture would be the result that the most broad-minded of the law profes-
sors, men such as Mark deWolfe Howe, Jr., Charles L. Black, Jr., the late
Zachariah Chafee and Berman himself, who have taught arts courses on Law,
become involved in the arts arena, and thereby enrich the life of the colleges
and the hours of arts faculties by their presence.
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